Ix. Stock Exchanges And The Antitrust
Laws by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 3 Article 16
Summer 6-1-1975
Ix. Stock Exchanges And The Antitrust Laws
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ix. Stock Exchanges And The Antitrust Laws, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 824 (1975),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol32/iss3/16
824 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
IX. STOCK EXCHANGES AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the national securities
exchanges are given wide leeway in promulgating rules for regulating
member firms.' However, the SEC reviews, and in some instances
revises, exchange rules pursuant to its duty to grant or withhold
registration of an exchange and its power to oversee exchange opera-
tions generally. 2 When an exchange's rules conflict with the provi-
sions of the antitrust laws,3 the question arises whether these regula-
tions are immune from antitrust scrutiny. The solution to the prob-
lem is complicated by the indirect nature of the SEC's supervision:
whether the rules are impliedly exempt from the antitrust laws by the
securities acts or whether they are private actions subject to antitrust
scrutiny is uncertain.
The Supreme Court in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange' exam-
ined this conflict and attempted to reconcile the policies of the anti-
trust and securities acts. Silver, a broker-dealer who was not a mem-
ber of the New York Stock Exchange, alleged that an Exchange deci-
sion, made without notice or a hearing, which required member firms
to sever their private wire connections with his office was a boycott
in violation of the Sherman Act.' The Court found that the SEC had
only general review powers over the Exchange's rules and did not
have jurisdiction to hear complaints about individual applications of
a rule.6 Since "[r]epeal [of the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as
implied only if necessary to make the Securities Exchange Act work,
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary," 7 and because
I Section 5 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78e (1970), makes unlawful exchanges of
securities involving interstate commerce on an unregistered exchange. Section 6, Id. §
78f, provides for registration procedures but grants the exchanges substantial freedom
in adopting their own rules by allowing all rules which are consistent with the securities
laws. Id. § 78f(c).
2 When an exchange makes application to the SEC for registration, before grant-
ing registration, the Commission reviews the exchange's rules to insure that they
comply with the securities laws and are "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and
to protect investors." § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1970). Further, § 19(b) gives the SEC
power to change exchange rules in twelve specific areas if fair dealing and investor
protection require. Id. § 78s(b).
The relevant federal antitrust provisions include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
1-7 (1970); the Clayton Act, Id. § 15; and the Robinson-Patman Act, Id. § 13.
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the SEC could not hear the case, the Court decided the case on its
merits.' Therefore, where the Commission has no jurisdiction over a
dispute the courts may hear the case.
The Seventh Circuit subsequently extended the Silver ruling be-
yond a situation in which the SEC had no review powers to areas over
which the Commission had potential, but unexercised, supervision.
In Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange,' the alleged
violation was the Exchange's anti-rebate rule which prevented a
member firm from sharing a commission on a sale with a nonmember
firm, even if the latter had furnished the order."0 The defendant Ex-
change argued that since the SEC had review power over exchange
rules fixing commission rates, the SEC should have exclusive juris-
diction of the case."1 The circuit court found, however, that the proper
interpretation of Silver required a test of whether judicial review of
the anti-rebate rule under the antitrust laws would "frustrate the
purposes of the Securities Exchange Act or make it substantially
ineffective." 2 Finding no evidence of actual SEC review, 3 and no
indication that judicial review would interfere with the policies of the
1934 Act, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment to the Exchange." Thus, following Silver and Thill
Securities, the emerging rule seemed to be that where the SEC could
not review the application of an exchange rule, or even where it had
potential but unexercised review power, the courts would hear the
case and would attempt to harmonize the operation of the securities
acts with the goals of the antitrust laws.
Following Thill Securities, the next logical step in extending the
jurisdiction of the courts in antitrust cases would allow the courts to
I Id. at 358-61. The Court held the Exchange liable for not giving the plaintiff
notice of the decision to sever the wires and an opportunity to be heard. Notice and
hearing requirements, the majority determined, would further rather than defeat the
goals of the 1934 Act. 373 U.S. at 361-67.
In some instances, however, summary procedures by the exchanges may be justi-
fied. The plaintiff in J. R. Williston & Beane, Inc. v. Haack, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,921 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 1974), a member of the New York Stock Exchange, com-
plained of his summary suspension after inspectors found that he did not meet the
Exchange's net capital requirements. The court found that in the crisis atmosphere at
the time of the "Salad Oil Scandal," justified this summary action.
433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971).
" Id. at 266-67.
" Id. at 267. Section 19b(9) gives the Commission revision power over "the fixing
of reasonable rates of commission." 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1970).
11 433 F.2d at 269-70.
13 Id. at 270-71.
" Id. at 275.
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hear cases involving exchange rules over which the SEC had exercised
actual supervision. The Second Circuit in Gordon v. New York Stock
Exchange, Inc.,' 5 however, recently declined to allow such an exten-
sion. The Gordon plaintiff, representing a class of securities purchas-
ers, alleged that the minimum commission system violated the anti-
trust laws. 6 The court found not only that § 19(b)1" of the 1934 Act
granted the SEC revision powers over commission schedules, but also
that the SEC was actually supervising and reforming the commission
system.18 Holding that these facts sufficiently distinguished Silver,
the Second Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant."1 In reaching this conclusion, the
court examined the language, the legislative history, and the policy
behind the Securities Exchange Act.
Section 19(b) of the 1934 Act, the circuit court found, created a
"core of exchange self-regulation necessary to make the 1934 Act
work." ° The court reasoned that since this section gives the SEC
revision powers over exchange rules "fixing reasonable rates of com-
mission," the commission rate question should be excluded from an-
titrust review under the Silver test." As support for this conclusion,
the decision examined the legislative history of the Act which indi-
cated that Congress consciously granted rate fixing power to the ex-
changes acting under SEC supervision. The court added that such a
grant of power "made clear [Congress'] judgment of the Commis-
sion's competence to assume the central role in assuring investor
protection and exchange fair dealing."2 Moreover, the court noted
that the SEC was currently scrutinizing the entire commission rate
"5 498 F.2d 1303 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 491 (1974).
1" More specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the discount allowed for large vol-
ume trading, allowance of negotiated rates only for orders in excess of $500,000, and a
surcharge on transactions involving less than 1,000 shares were all part of a system of
price discrimination which violated the Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts. 498 F.2d
at 1304.
,1 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1970).
,1 498 F.2d at 1308-09.
" Id. at 1311.
20 Id. at 1306. The reference by the court was to the Silver opinion in which the
Court left open the question of whether an antitrust court could hear cases involving
exchange rules which the SEC actively reviews. "Were there Commission jurisdiction
• ..for scrutiny of a particular exchange ruling . . .a different case would arise
concerning exemption from the operation of laws designed to prevent anticompetitive
activity, an issue we do not decide today." Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S.
341, 358 n.12 (1963) (citations omitted).
21 See text accompanying note 7 supra.
498 F.2d at 1307.
1975] , 1974 SECURITIES LAW DEVELOPMENTS 827
system and was slowly introducing negotiated rates in the place of
fixed rates.? Consequently, judicial interference with the SEC's pro-
gram could frustrate the 1934 Act's goal of maintaining solvent and
fair securities firms by increasing the economic problems caused by
the introduction of a negotiated rate system. Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit concluded that judicial activity should be restricted to review of
the SEC's decisions pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act.
4
A district court in the Seventh Circuit, however, refused to follow
the Gordon court and instead exercised jurisdiction in the commis-
sion rate case of Fredrickson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith.? The district judge, following the maxim of construction that
repeal by implication is strongly disfavored, found that the courts
had secondary jurisdiction over commission rate cases which was
concurrent with the primary jurisdiction of the SEC.2 Deciding that
it would be useless to remand the case to the SEC because the Com-
mission's actual review of rates demonstrated its approval of the
challenged rate structure, the court retained jurisdiction in the case.?
Although the question of whether fixed commission rates violate
the antitrust laws has been essentially mooted by the SEC's adoption
" Id. at 1308-09. The introduction of negotiated rates was by necessity a slow and
guarded process due to the potentially disruptive effects a negotiated rate system
might have on marginal brokerage firms.
21 Id. at 1311.
Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), app. pndg., 2d Cir., CCH
FED. SEC. L. REP. 73,031 presented the question of whether exchange rules governing
the basis for determining registered representatives' commissions were subject to anti-
trust scrutiny. Finding that the SEC had broad review powers over the commission
rate system, the court held that rules governing the registered representatives' commis-
sions were not within the SEC's review jurisdiction. Thus the court heard and deter-
mined the case.
Similarly, the district court in Abbot Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 384 F.
Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1974), found that there was sufficient discretion left within the
SEC's guidelines for the exchanges to act in a manner contrary to the antitrust laws.
Id. at 670. For this reason, the court retained jurisdiction of the case.
1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,792 (N.D. ill. Sept. 9, 1974).
24 Id. at 96,630-31. "The precise function of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
to guide a court in determining whether the court should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question .... .
3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 19.01, at 3 (1958). See Ricci v. Chicago
Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 307 (1973); 1 F. VON BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW §§ 213-225 (1942).
" Both the Gordon and the Fredrickson courts relied on the SEC's active review
of commission rates but reached different results under different theories.
1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,792, at 96,631.
